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Abstract 
When finding a best explanation for observed symptoms a 
multitude of information has to be integrated and matched 
against explanations stored in memory. Although assumptions 
about ongoing memory processes can be derived from the 
process models, little process data exists that would allow to 
sufficiently test these assumptions.  
In order to explore memory processes in diagnostic 
reasoning, 29 participants were asked to solve a visual 
reasoning task (the Black Box paradigm) where critical 
information had to be retrieved from memory. 
This study focused on differentiating between processes 
that take place during the encoding and the evaluation of 
symptom information by comparing eye movement measures 
(the number of fixation and fixation duration per dwell).  
Results will be discussed in light of existing theories on 
sequential diagnostic reasoning. Further, it will be discussed 
to which extent eye movements can be informative about 
memory processes underlying sequential diagnostic 
reasoning.  
Keywords: diagnostic reasoning; eye tracking; process 
tracing; encoding-processing differences 
Introduction 
In sequential diagnostic reasoning multiple pieces of 
information have to be combined to find a best explanation 
for observed symptoms (e.g., Johnson & Krems, 2001). It is 
a complex cognitive process since the reasoner generates an 
undefined number of explanations for any number of 
observations (Johnson & Krems, 2001). Nevertheless, 
understanding this process is a major goal of research 
concerning reasoning and problem solving because of its 
high practical relevance. For instance, in the medical 
context, a complete understanding of diagnostic reasoning 
can help to save lives by improving the process of forming 
the right diagnosis (Mehlhorn, Taatgen, Lebiere, & Krems, 
2011). But there are more applications such as finding the 
error in a technical system like a car or a computer (Johnson 
& Krems, 2001; Krems & Zierer, 1994; Mehlhorn et al., 
2011). For instance, imagine you experience a loss in power 
of your car. Later, you witness some blue smoke coming 
from your exhaust pipe. Furthermore, you feel that recently, 
your car needs more oil as usual and your “check engine” 
light turns on. By combining these observations, you come 
up with the explanation that your car has an engine damage.  
Diagnostic reasoning involves the processing of a number 
of observations and explanations. Often, the reasoner does 
not have all the necessary information available at once, but 
receives them in a sequential order. The reasoner then needs 
to integrate the symptom information into a situation model 
containing symptoms and explanations (Johnson & Krems, 
2001; Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Schaeken, 1992).  
Besides this complexity, people are generally able to solve 
problems (Johnson & Krems, 2001), but how do they 
successfully engage in this demanding task? A number of 
process models (e.g., TAR: Johnson & Krems, 2001; TEC: 
Thagard, 1989; HyGene: Thomas, Dougherty, Sprenger, & 
Harbison, 2008) provide assumptions about ongoing 
memory processes. For instance, TAR assumes that encoded 
symptoms have to be evaluated concerning their fit with the 
current model of explanations (Johnson & Krems, 2001) and 
HyGene states that newly encoded information has to be 
judged concerning its implication for existing explanations 
(e.g., Thomas et al., 2008). Thus, in order to test these 
process assumptions, it is necessary to disentangle encoding 
and processing. Therefore, the process of diagnostic 
reasoning needs to be made visible. So far, different 
methodological approaches exist to trace memory processes 
in higher order cognitive tasks like judgement and decision 
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making (e.g., Glaholt & Reingold, 2011; Schulte-
Mecklenbeck, Kühberger, & Ranyard, 2011).  
Recently, eye tracking is employed as a process tracing 
method to assess memory processes (see Glaholt & 
Reingold, 2011; Jahn & Braatz, 2014; Schulte-Mecklenbeck 
et al., 2011). Advanced hardware and improved 
understanding of its measures make it possible to get better 
insights (Jahn & Braatz, 2014; Renkewitz & Jahn, 2012; 
Scholz, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2015).  
Monitoring eye movements allows the study of cognitive 
processes while participants interact with present objects 
without causing any restrictions and with minimal intrusions 
on the participant’s behavior (Glaholt & Reingold, 2011). 
But interpreting eye tracking measures is challenging. The 
growing number of measures and their variety of 
applications complicate the assignment of specific measures 
to specific cognitive processes (Holmqvist et al., 2011). 
Glaholt and Reingold, (2011) present a way to 
differentiate between encoding and processing in decision 
making by analyzing eye movement data. They asked 
participants to choose one picture out of a set of nine. They 
categorized dwells (defined as the sum of fixation durations 
of all fixations from the moment the gaze enters an area 
until it exits this area) into first-visit dwells and re-visit 
dwells, whereas re-visit dwells are the repeated viewing of 
an alternative. They found that mean fixation durations per 
dwell increases over time. The number of fixation per dwell 
is increasing between first-visits and re-visits as well. This 
indicates processing, such as evaluation of the current 
stimuli. The researchers interpreted these results as evidence 
that early in the process, participants merely screened the 
stimuli, moving to processing of the stimuli as they try to 
reach a decision. Even very early research finds evidence 
that the deliberate processing of information results in more 
and longer fixations (Loftus & Mackworth, 1978). As 
screening/encoding is assumed to happen implicitly without 
conscious control (Betsch, Hoffmann, Hoffrage, & Plessner, 
2003) few fixations are plausible and in line with 
assumptions by Horstmann, Ahlgrimm, and Glöckner, 
(2009). Increased number of fixations, on the other hand, 
reflect processes such as the evaluation of an alternative 
which emerge later in the process of decision making 
(Horstmann et al., 2009). In contrast to Glaholt and 
Reingold (2011), Horstmann et al., (2009) did not find 
evidence that processing is associated with longer fixation 
durations.  
Previous research on differences in eye movement patterns 
between encoding and processing of information in memory 
focuses on decision making. We assume that it is possible to 
use the knowledge about processes of decision making in 
the context of diagnostic reasoning as well. Encoding and 
processing differences are part of many models and 
assumptions. Whenever there is something to decide, we 
encode much information in a short period of time and 
subsequently evaluate and process this information 
(Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). As stated by TAR or HyGene 
(Johnson & Krems, 2001; Thomas et al., 2008), we assume 
that the same holds true when finding a best explanation for 
a set of symptoms.  
Congruently, we assume that encoding and processing can 
be differentiated by the means of eye tracking measures, i.e. 
analyzing fixation duration and number of fixation per 
dwell. Following Glaholt and Reingold, (2011) and 
Horstmann et al., (2009) we assume that the number of 
fixation per dwell is increased during processes which 
appear later in the reasoning process such as symptom 
evaluation compared to the encoding of information.  
In order to test our hypothesis, we used a task where 
information was presented in a sequential order. Remember 
the example with the engine trouble, people most likely 
witness one symptom such as the power loss at first and 
subsequently watch for more symptoms which are usually 
discovered one after another. In addition we need a task 
with the complexity comparable to that of everyday life 
problems. There were many symptoms pointing in the 
direction of engine damage, some of which might be related. 
The blue smoke is easily explained as soon as you know 
about the increased oil consumption. The car might burn 
some oil. On the other hand, we needed to control for prior 
knowledge of participants to get comparable results. 
Additionally, the task has to be learnable in an experimental 
setting. These requirements are met in Black Box task 
(BBX, Johnson & Krems, 2001). The Black Box task is a 
reasoning paradigm in which all information is, just as in 
our car example, visuospatial in nature. The symptoms are 
related to different areas of the car such as the exhaust pipe, 
the cockpit, or the dipstick in the motor compartment. 
Therefore, the Black Box task is especially suited to study 
memory processes during diagnostic reasoning with eye 
movements. 
Method 
Participants solved the Black Box task while their eye 
movements were recorded. In the Black Box paradigm, the 
participants’ task is to determine a hidden state of a device 
using indirect evidence that needs to be combined following 
specific rules. Participants first learn and then apply the 
rules to get insight into the device by explaining 
observations with a combination of causes. 
Participants 
Twenty-nine students enrolled at Technische Universität 
Chemnitz took part in the experiment. One participant had 
to be excluded due to technical problems. Of the remaining 
participants 20 were female and 8 were male with a mean 
age of M = 22.3 (SD = 3). All participants had normal or 
corrected to normal vision.  
Task and Apparatus 
The participants’ task is to locate hidden atoms in the 
Black Box which consists of a 10 x 10 grid by watching 
where light rays enter and exit the box. Participants do not 
see the path of the light rays. They only see the entrance and 
exit position of the light rays. As shown in Figure 1 each 
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atom has a field of influence (a circle around the atom). 
Hitting this field, the light rays get reflected and exit the 
box, depending on where in the box an atom is located. 
Participants have to place the atoms based on the 
information drawn from the rays that were shot in the box.  
The participant has to place as many atom markers at the 
grid as needed to explain the ray pattern of one trial without 
placing more atoms as absolutely necessary. During one 
trial, the participant watches a fixed number of rays in 
sequential order one at a time displayed by numbers 
marking the entrance and exit of the current ray (Figure 2). 
Participants have to remember where the rays entered and 
exited the Black Box as well as the atom locations of 
already set atoms, because, just as in the car example, 
symptoms might be related. For instance, it is possible that a 
previous pattern needs to be remembered to explain the 
current one (as illustrated in Figure 2: Ray five can be 
explained by ray three.) Therefore, the paradigm allows to 
measure memory processes that take place in sequential 
diagnostic reasoning. The participant decides when to move 
on to the next ray by pressing the space bar. How many rays 
are left during one trial is shown at the upper left corner of 
each Black Box (cue). An exemplary trial is pictured in 
Figure 2.  
The study recorded gaze data using a binocular IViewX 
RED eye-tracking system from SensoMotric Instruments 
with a sampling rate of 120 Hz. Data was analyzed with 
BeGaze 3.0, Microsoft Excel 2007 and IBM Statistics 23 
(SPSS). 
Stimuli were presented on a 22-inch computer screen 
using EPrime 2.0 software with a resolution of 1680 × 1050 
pixels. All subjects were seated at a distance of 600 to 800 
mm in front of the screen. 
Procedure 
Each participant was tested individually. After an initial 
instruction phase, in which participants were familiarized 
with the rules of the Black Box, two training phases 
followed. During the first training phase, rays and atoms 
were visible throughout the trial and therefore did not have 
to be remembered. In the second training phase participants 
solved the trial under test conditions (memory-based). That 
is, they only saw where the current ray of light entered and 
exited the Black Box and the cue in the upper left corner 
(showing how many rays are left in the current trial). They 
saw the atom and its field of influence as soon as they 
placed it by using the mouse until they demanded a new ray 
shot into the Black Box. No prior rays or atoms were 
present. Each training phase consisted of seven trials. A 
calibration and 48 test trials followed. The experiment 
ended after a short survey containing demographic 
questions. Participants needed 53 to 127 minutes to 
complete the entire experiment (M = 85.2 min; SD = 21.1).  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Rules in the Black Box. 
If the ray does not hit any atom, it goes straight through the 
Black Box (1). If a ray hits the field of influence at an angle, 
it is reflected 90 degree. This results in a L-pattern (2). If a 
ray hits a field of influence of an atom straight forward, it is 
absorbed (3). The ray does not exit. Hitting a second field of 
influence after being already reflected the light ray path 
results in an U-pattern (4) or a Zick-Zack-pattern (5). Note, 
light ray paths and atom locations are not visible for the 
participant and have to be inferred. In this example all five 
observations can be explained by three atoms. 
Analysis 
To test our hypotheses, quadratic Areas of Interests (AOIs) 
were drawn around each square of the grid resulting in 100 
separate AOIs, also called gridded AOIs (see Holmqvist et 
al., 2011). Furthermore, we coded the AOIs where the rays 
entered and exited the Black Box, where they hit the field of 
influence of an atom and where atoms had to be set.  
Following Glaholt and Reingold, (2011) we identified the 
order of dwells in the AOIs and compared first-visit and re-
visit dwells. First-visits are termed the first dwell in each 
AOI. Re-visits are all repeated dwells in that AOI. Re-visit 
dwells integrate all dwells from the second till the last dwell 
per AOI. In this point we slightly differ from the methods 
applied by Glaholt and Reingold, (2011) who defined every 
dwell as a re-visit that follows after any AOI is viewed a 
second time, even if the gaze hits an AOI not viewed yet. In 
decision making the transition between encoding the 
alternatives and their evaluation is believed to be the point 
in time where the first alternative is viewed a second time 
(Russo & Leclerc, 1994). Since our material is relatively 
complex we expect participants only to be able to encode 
information if they actually look at it. If the gaze shifts to a 
different AOI, information need to be encoded and 
subsequently evaluated as well. Therefore, for diagnostic 
reasoning, we expect that the first dwell into an AOI reflects 
encoding and that all subsequent dwells in that same area 
represent evaluation processes since participants test the 
implication of the information for the current explanation 
(e.g., Johnson & Krems, 2001).  
We expect every first-visit of an area to map onto the 
encoding of that area. Even if a dwell consist of only one 
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fixation; we are confident that participants encoded this 
location sufficiently during their first visit since we defined 
a fixation with a minimum duration of 80 ms which is 
enough time to gather information since 50 to 60 ms are 
assumed enough time to encode even words (Rayner, 2009). 
During every re-visit of that same area we expect 
participants to process this location since it is already 
encoded.  
For every dwell we calculated the mean number of 
fixations and the mean fixation duration. We aggregated 
first-visit dwells and re-visit dwells over every symptom 
presentation, trial and participant.  
Results 
Participants tended to look mostly at task relevant areas. 
Aggregated over symptom presentations, trials and 
participants 12.08 % of the fixation time was on average 
directed to the AOI containing the atom (SD = 9.05). The 
participants looked mostly to the AOI where the rays hit the 
field of influence of an atom (M = 21.16 %, SD = 14.76) and 
14.63 % of the fixation time fell on average to the two AOIs 
covering the rays (SD = 7.00). 5.24 % of the time 
participants fixated on the AOI with the cue in the upper left 
corner (SD = 4.15). Taken together, participants looked 
more than 50% of the time to direct task-relevant AOIs 
which covered only about 5 % of the grid. Fixation duration 
weighted by the number of AOIs, participants looked 
significantly longer to the atoms (t(27) = 19.82, p < .001, d 
= 3.81), to the field of influence of the atom (t(27) = 20.38, 
p < .001, d = 3.92), to the rays (t(27) = 20.45; p = <-001, d = 
3.80) and to the cue in the upper left corner (t(27) = 12.86, p 
< .001, d = 2.47) than to all the other AOIs.  
They found correct solutions for most of the trials (M = 
71.3%, SD = 0.13). Therefore, we conclude that participants 
have understood task instructions and engaged in diagnostic 
reasoning as we intended. 
The calibration procedure reached a satisfying accuracy 
with a mean deviation of M = 0.54° (SD = 0.53).  
We assumed that encoding and processing can be 
differentiated by the means of the eye tracking measures 
analyzing dwells concerning fixation duration and fixation 
frequency. More precisely, our hypothesis predicted that 
fixation duration and number of fixations per dwell is 
increased during re-visits compared to first-visits, assuming 
that first-visits represent encoding whereas re-visits map 
onto processing. 
Over all, we find longer fixations during re-visits than 
first-visits (Mfirst-visits = 267 ms, SD = 45, Mre-visits = 279 ms, 
SD = 51, t(27) =- 1.94, p = .06, d = 0.37) and we find 
significant more fixations during re-visit dwells compared to 
first-visit dwells (Mfirst-visits = 1.25, SD = 0.09, Mre-visits = 
1.31, SD = 0.10, t(27) =- 4.11, p < .001, d = 0.79).  
An analysis of the different pattern separately shows that 
there are differences. To illustrate this, we exemplary report 
the L-pattern and the absorption in Table 1.  
The increase in fixation duration and the significant 
increase in number of fixations per dwell during re-visits 
compared to first-visits support our hypothesis that encoding 
and processing can be differentiated by the means of the eye 
tracking measures as Glaholt and Reingold, (2011) assumed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Exemplary trial 
The trial consists of five rays shot into the Black Box 
sequentially. For each ray the participant can place atoms to 
explain them. When finished with one ray the participant 
decides when to move on to the next one. The number (cue) 
in the upper left corner shows how many more rays are to 
come in the current trial. In this example the participant 
should notice that no new atom need to be placed for ray 
five since this ray can be explained by the atom already set 
for ray three. 
t 
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Table 1: Analysis of L-pattern and Absorption 
  L-pattern Absorption 
Mean 
fixation 
duration 
per dwell 
First-visit 
M (SD) 
277ms (51) 255 ms (44) 
Re-visit 
M (SD) 
279 ms (51) 280 ms (64) 
t-test 
t(27) =- 0.27, p = 
.79 , d = 0.05 
t(27) =- 2.31, p 
= .03, d = 0.44 
Number 
of 
fixations 
per dwell 
First-visit 
M (SD) 
1.26 (0.09) 1.19 (0.11) 
Re-visit 
M (SD) 
1.34 (0.13) 1.27 (0.15) 
t-test 
t(27) =- 4.46, p < 
.001, d = 0.83 
t(27) =- 2.59, p 
= .02, d = 0.50 
 
Discussion 
This study aimed to find a measure which is able to describe 
reasoning processes differentiating between encoding and 
processing. Therefore, we employed eye tracking as a 
process tracing method because it is an objective and fine 
grained measure to human behavior. Following research by 
Glaholt and Reingold, (2011) and Horstmann et al., (2009) 
we assumed that encoding and processing can be 
differentiated by analyzing dwells concerning fixation 
duration and fixation frequency.  
Horstmann et al., (2009) and Glaholt and Reingold, (2011) 
showed that a higher number of fixations might be an 
indicator for more deliberate thinking and processing. Since 
we assume encoding to be more intuitive and number of 
fixations increases during re-visits when processing takes 
place, our results support the research of Horstmann and 
colleagues (2009) as well as Glaholt und Reingold, (2011). 
Over all patterns as well as for L-pattern and absorption 
individually increases the number of fixation with medium 
to high effects. In line with the research by Horstmann et al., 
(2009) the analysis of fixation duration draws a less clear 
picture. It might be that there is not such a clear difference 
in fixation duration between (more intuitive) encoding and 
(deliberate) processing as Horstmann et al., pointed out. The 
researchers assume that intuitive and deliberate processes 
may have similar underlying mechanisms as indicated by no 
clearly distinct differences in fixation durations. The 
differences between encoding and processing might not be 
qualitative in nature but mainly quantitative regarding 
information sampling. However clear differences between 
L-pattern and absorption might indicate that both patterns 
are not strictly similar processed. Horstmann et al., (200) 
state that there may still be crucial differences regarding 
intuitive and deliberate processes, which cannot be shown 
by this measure. Since absorptions only identify the row or 
column of the atom location, a second ray of light is needed 
to determine the exact location in the Black Box, making the 
absorption a more complex pattern. It remains to future 
research to investigate the differences in processing of 
different rules. Therefore the analysis of U-pattern and Zick-
Zack- patterns may be useful, as they are more complex as 
well. They are not included in the results of this paper since 
those patterns are not used frequently enough throughout the 
experiment to produce a reliable data basis.  
 We rule out the possibility that participants did not process 
during re-visit dwells but encoded new features of already 
encoded information. Since a single AOI contained simple 
material with not much features like colors or different 
shapes we consider this alternative very unlikely in this 
specific task.  
 Further, we are confident that participants actually 
encoded and processed what they were looking at. The fact 
that participants reached fairly good response accuracies in 
spite of a difficult and strongly memory based task speaks in 
favor of this assumption. There was no evident reason to 
separate eye movements and attention while solving the 
Black Box task.  
 Since looking back to associated, but emptied spatial 
locations can facilitate memory retrieval (e.g., Scholz, 
Mehlhorn, & Krems, 2016), it is an interesting questions 
whether there is a connection between gaze behavior and 
accuracy during diagnostic reasoning, too. Do people who 
solve the task successfully show a different gaze pattern? 
Since our participants reached a fairly high response 
accuracy in solving the trials, it is difficult to draw causal 
conclusions to this question from our data. Future research 
should address this question by careful manipulations.  
 We were able to replicate Glaholt and Reingolds (2011) 
results that an increased number of fixations to an already 
viewed area is an indicator for evaluation and processing of 
information. However, it is difficult to make a clear 
statement regarding the mean fixation duration per dwell.
 In conclusion, eye movements show a high potential to 
assess memory processes during higher-order reasoning and 
thinking (see also Jahn & Braatz, 2014; Renkewitz & Jahn, 
2012; Scholz et al., 2015). In particular, the number of 
fixations per dwell may be used as process tracing measures 
to asses processing during diagnostic reasoning. We found 
increased number of fixations during a dwell to indicate 
processing of information. The fact that we found a measure 
that indicates evaluation processes allows for a more 
detailed testing of process assumptions derived by process 
models on diagnostic reasoning such as TAR (Johnson & 
Krems, 2001), HyGene (Thomas et al., 2008) or TEC 
(Thagard, 1989). All these models make assumption about 
the manner in which the reasoner links observation or 
symptoms to a set of explanations. Thereby the models 
differ in their predictions to how this link is processed. TEC 
for instance, describes this process as a judgment to which 
extend symptoms and explanations are coherent (Thagard, 
1989). Thereby, the encoding and evaluation of all 
information to reach a judgement is supposed to happen 
parallel. HyGene on the other hand, gives insight about the 
way explanations are generated and used to asses new 
information (Thomas et al., 2008). HyGene states that new 
information are encoded sequentially and have to be judged 
concerning their implication for existing explanations. TAR 
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describes diagnostic reasoning as a deliberate 
comprehension process in which observations are 
sequentially interpreted and integrated into a mental model 
(Johnson & Krems, 2001). TAR assumes that one 
information is encoded and evaluated before new 
information is gathered, making encoding and processes 
closely intertwined. All models have in common that they 
assume perception-action cycles with different encoding and 
processing phases. To describe reasoning, we need to know 
how people use information to reach causal conclusions. 
Therefore the first step is to know when people simply 
gather information and when they actually use it for 
evaluation, comparison or processing.  
 The process tracing measure presented in this paper may 
help to disentangle encoding and processing assumptions 
stated by different models giving more insight into 
diagnostic reasoning by providing a possibility to identify 
processing phases and test for precise research questions. 
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